The paper is devoted to the mathematical analysis of an optimal control problem arising in a generalized principal-agent model with limited liability constraint. We present the economic model and the mathematical formulation. Though the problem seems ``simple'', it presents many difficulties that are hard to overcome. After a formal resolution, we give an existence and uniqueness result for this problem.
Publié le : 2004-07-05
Classification:
Optimal contro,
Bottleneck constraints,
Incentives,
Delegation,
Personnel Economics,
AMS 49J20, 49M25,
[MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
@article{hal-00022036,
author = {Bergounioux, Ma\"\i tine and Ollier, Sandrine},
title = {An Optimal Control Problem Arising in a Generalized Principal-Agent Model with Limited Liability},
journal = {HAL},
volume = {2004},
number = {0},
year = {2004},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/hal-00022036}
}
Bergounioux, Maïtine; Ollier, Sandrine. An Optimal Control Problem Arising in a Generalized Principal-Agent Model with Limited Liability. HAL, Tome 2004 (2004) no. 0, . http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/hal-00022036/