We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading mechanisms of cooperation.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc80-0-10,
author = {Gy\"orgy Szab\'o},
title = {Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
volume = {83},
year = {2008},
pages = {197-215},
zbl = {1141.91330},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc80-0-10}
}
György Szabó. Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. Banach Center Publications, Tome 83 (2008) pp. 197-215. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc80-0-10/