This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-21,
author = {David M. Ramsey and Krzysztof Szajowski},
title = {Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
volume = {72},
year = {2006},
pages = {253-265},
zbl = {1171.91364},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-21}
}
David M. Ramsey; Krzysztof Szajowski. Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem. Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006) pp. 253-265. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-21/