The main purpose of this paper is to analyze a development of a scenario suggested by Baston and Garnaev (2005) for modelling the situation where two departments in a large organization are each seeking to make an appointment within the same area of expertise, for instance, a computer science specialist. The departments are interested in three skills of the candidate (say, writing code, communication and in algorithms). In our scenario Department 1 wants to employ a candidate with excellent skills in writing code and communication. Department 2 is looking for a candidate with excellent skills in developing algorithms and communication. So, the departments have a joint interest, as well as their own interest. The scenario is modelled by a multistage non-zero sum game. Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg strategies are derived.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-11,
author = {A. Y. Garnaev},
title = {A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
volume = {72},
year = {2006},
pages = {137-145},
zbl = {1106.60007},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-11}
}
A. Y. Garnaev. A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments. Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006) pp. 137-145. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-11/