Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited
Zhengan Huang ; Shengli Liu ; Baodong Qin ; Kefei Chen
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Tome 25 (2015), p. 415-430 / Harvested from The Polish Digital Mathematics Library

Fehr et al. (2010) proposed the first sender-equivocable encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (NCCCA) and proved that NC-CCA security implies security against selective opening chosen-ciphertext attacks (SO-CCA). The NC-CCA security proof of the scheme relies on security against substitution attacks of a new primitive, the “crossauthentication code”. However, the security of the cross-authentication code cannot be guaranteed when all the keys used in the code are exposed. Our key observation is that, in the NC-CCA security game, the randomness used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext is exposed to the adversary. Based on this observation, we provide a security analysis of Fehr et al.'s scheme, showing that its NC-CCA security proof is flawed. We also point out that the scheme of Fehr et al. encrypting a single-bit plaintext can be refined to achieve NC-CCA security, free of the cross-authentication code. Furthermore, we propose the notion of “strong cross-authentication code”, apply it to Fehr et al.'s scheme, and show that the new version of the latter achieves NC-CCA security for multi-bit plaintexts.

Publié le : 2015-01-01
EUDML-ID : urn:eudml:doc:270433
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     author = {Zhengan Huang and Shengli Liu and Baodong Qin and Kefei Chen},
     title = {Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited},
     journal = {International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science},
     volume = {25},
     year = {2015},
     pages = {415-430},
     zbl = {1322.68069},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-amcv25i2p415bwm}
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Zhengan Huang; Shengli Liu; Baodong Qin; Kefei Chen. Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Tome 25 (2015) pp. 415-430. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-amcv25i2p415bwm/

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