Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes
Kistler, Max
Philosophia Scientiae, Tome 7 (2003), p. 189-219 / Harvested from Numdam

Je propose une théorie réaliste des lois, en termes de “tropes” (ou instances de propriétés), qui évite les problèmes de “l'analyse du meilleur système” et le “problème de l'inférence” qui se pose au réalisme des universaux. J'analyse le concept de situation exceptionnelle, caractérisée comme une situation dans laquelle un objet particulier satisfait l'antécédent mais non le conséquent de la régularité associée à la loi, sans pour autant réfuter la loi. Pour tenir compte de cette possibilité, il faut concevoir les propriétés mises en relation par une loi, comme dispositionnelles et non nécessairement manifestes.

I propose a realist theory of laws formulated in terms of tropes (or property instances) that avoids both the problems of the “best-systems-analysis” and the “inference problem” of realism of universals. I analyze the concept of an exceptional situation, characterized as a situation in which a particular object satisfies the antecedent but not the consequent of the regularity associated with a law, without thereby falsifying that law. To take this possibility into account, the properties linked by a law must be conceived as dispositional and not necessarily manifest.

Publié le : 2003-01-01
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     author = {Kistler, Max},
     title = {Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes},
     journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
     volume = {7},
     year = {2003},
     pages = {189-219},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/PHSC_2003__7_2_189_0}
}
Kistler, Max. Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes. Philosophia Scientiae, Tome 7 (2003) pp. 189-219. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/PHSC_2003__7_2_189_0/

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