Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities
Atkinson, David ; Peijnenburg, Jeanne
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 50 (2009) no. 1, p. 183-193 / Harvested from Project Euclid
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Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
Publié le : 2009-04-15
Classification:  probabilistic justification,  infinitism,  foundationalism,  conditional and unconditional probabilities,  60A99 
@article{1242067709,
     author = {Atkinson, David and Peijnenburg, Jeanne},
     title = {Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities},
     journal = {Notre Dame J. Formal Logic},
     volume = {50},
     number = {1},
     year = {2009},
     pages = { 183-193},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/1242067709}
}

Atkinson, David; Peijnenburg, Jeanne. Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 50 (2009) no. 1, pp.  183-193. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/1242067709/