Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning
Shafer, Glenn
Ann. Statist., Tome 10 (1982) no. 1, p. 1075-1089 / Harvested from Project Euclid
The introductory section of Thomas Bayes's famous essay on probability contains two arguments for what we now call the rule of conditioning. The first argument, which leads to Bayes's third proposition, can be made rigorous if we use rooted trees to represent the step-by-step determination of events. The second argument, which leads to Bayes's fifth proposition, does not stand up to scrutiny.
Publié le : 1982-12-14
Classification:  Bayes,  conditional probability,  exact events,  rooted trees,  60A05,  62A15
@article{1176345974,
     author = {Shafer, Glenn},
     title = {Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning},
     journal = {Ann. Statist.},
     volume = {10},
     number = {1},
     year = {1982},
     pages = { 1075-1089},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/1176345974}
}
Shafer, Glenn. Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning. Ann. Statist., Tome 10 (1982) no. 1, pp.  1075-1089. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/1176345974/