This paper analyzes a model of formation of connected coalitions in a cooperative game. This model is a communication situation, and the Shapley value of this graph-restricted game is the Myerson value. The potential function for cooperative games was defined by Hart and Mas-Colell, and Winter showed that the Myerson value admits a potential function. We study a recursive procedure for computing the potential of the Myerson value. In section 3, we use the Myerson value for measuring voting power in the Spanish and the Andalusian Parliaments.
@article{urn:eudml:doc:40221,
title = {El potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para juegos restringidos por grafos.},
journal = {Q\"uestii\'o},
volume = {20},
year = {1996},
pages = {71-86},
mrnumber = {MR1409308},
language = {es},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/urn:eudml:doc:40221}
}
Bilbao Arrese, J. M.; López Vázquez, Jorge. El potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para juegos restringidos por grafos.. Qüestiió, Tome 20 (1996) pp. 71-86. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/urn:eudml:doc:40221/