The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover, it satisfies a new desirable axiom, Equal Area Twisting. It is surprising that no standard solution of bargaining problems has this property. The solution considered can be generalized in a very natural and unique way to n-person bargaining problems.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-zmv25i3p285bwm,
author = {Tadeusz Radzik},
title = {On a new solution concept for bargaining problems},
journal = {Applicationes Mathematicae},
volume = {25},
year = {1998},
pages = {285-294},
zbl = {1050.91501},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-zmv25i3p285bwm}
}
Radzik, Tadeusz. On a new solution concept for bargaining problems. Applicationes Mathematicae, Tome 25 (1998) pp. 285-294. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-zmv25i3p285bwm/
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