The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-9,
author = {Sjur Didrik Fl\aa m and Andrzej Wieczorek},
title = {Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
volume = {72},
year = {2006},
pages = {115-123},
zbl = {1255.91030},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-9}
}
Sjur Didrik Flåm; Andrzej Wieczorek. Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players. Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006) pp. 115-123. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-9/