We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing symmetric games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.
@article{bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-19,
author = {J. Mi\k ekisz},
title = {Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
volume = {72},
year = {2006},
pages = {237-242},
zbl = {1255.91016},
language = {en},
url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-19}
}
J. Miękisz. Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players. Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006) pp. 237-242. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-19/