Recognition rules in weighted majority games and their implications
Krzysztof Kasprzyk
Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006), p. 185-194 / Harvested from The Polish Digital Mathematics Library
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This paper examines implications of different random recognition rules used to select proposal-makers on the payoffs of players participating in a weighted majority game. In particular, incentives to strategically alter the set of players by strategic splits or mergers are investigated.

Publié le : 2006-01-01
EUDML-ID : urn:eudml:doc:281937 
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     author = {Krzysztof Kasprzyk},
     title = {Recognition rules in weighted majority games and their implications},
     journal = {Banach Center Publications},
     volume = {72},
     year = {2006},
     pages = {185-194},
     zbl = {1255.91041},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-14}
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Krzysztof Kasprzyk. Recognition rules in weighted majority games and their implications. Banach Center Publications, Tome 72 (2006) pp. 185-194. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-14/