Note sur le calcul de la probabilité des paradoxes du vote
Berg, Sven ; Lepelley, Dominique
Mathématiques et Sciences humaines, Tome 120 (1992), p. 33-48 / Harvested from Numdam
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De nombreux travaux se sont efforcés au cours des années récentes de calculer la probabilité des paradoxes ou des difficultés que la théorie des choix collectifs a mis en évidence. On passe en revue dans cette note les principaux modèles de calcul utilisés dans ces travaux. On applique en outre l'un des modèles présentés au calcul de la probabilité de quelques paradoxes bien connus de la théorie du vote.

A number of papers have recently attempted to calculate the probability of the paradoxes or difficulties that social choice theory has discovered. We review in this note most of the probabilistic models which have been used in these papers. Furthermore, we apply one of these models to the computation of the probability of some well known voting paradoxes.

Publié le : 1992-01-01
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     author = {Berg, Sven and Lepelley, Dominique},
     title = {Note sur le calcul de la probabilit\'e des paradoxes du vote},
     journal = {Math\'ematiques et Sciences humaines},
     volume = {120},
     year = {1992},
     pages = {33-48},
     mrnumber = {1209061},
     zbl = {0845.90016},
     language = {fr},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/MSH_1992__120__33_0}
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Berg, Sven; Lepelley, Dominique. Note sur le calcul de la probabilité des paradoxes du vote. Mathématiques et Sciences humaines, Tome 120 (1992) pp. 33-48. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/MSH_1992__120__33_0/

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