We consider a naive implementation of the QC-LDPC McEliececryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks informa-tion about positions of ones in the secret matrix $Q$. We argue that thisleakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix $Q$.
@article{475, title = {Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem}, journal = {Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications}, volume = {65}, year = {2016}, doi = {10.2478/tatra.v67i0.475}, language = {EN}, url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/475} }
Fabšič, Tomáš; Gallo, Ondrej; Hromada, Viliam. Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, Tome 65 (2016) . doi : 10.2478/tatra.v67i0.475. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/475/