The question of the origin of polyadic expressivity is explored and the results
are brought to bear on Bertrand Russell's 1903 theory of denoting concepts,
which is the main object of criticism in his 1905 "On Denoting." It is shown
that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the background ontology of
the earlier theory of denoting enables the full-blown expressive power of
first-order polyadic quantification theory without any syntactic accommodation
of scopal differences among denoting phrases such as 'all φ', 'every
φ', and 'any φ' on the one hand, and 'some φ'
and 'a φ' on the other. The case provides an especially vivid
illustration of the general point that structural (or ideological) austerity can
be paid for in the coin of ontological extravagance.