Agreeing to Disagree
Aumann, Robert J.
Ann. Statist., Tome 4 (1976) no. 1, p. 1236-1239 / Harvested from Project Euclid
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Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.
Publié le : 1976-11-14
Classification:  Information,  subjective probability,  posterior,  statistics,  game theory,  revising probabilities,  concensus,  Harsanyi doctrine,  62A15,  62C05,  90A05,  90D35 
@article{1176343654,
     author = {Aumann, Robert J.},
     title = {Agreeing to Disagree},
     journal = {Ann. Statist.},
     volume = {4},
     number = {1},
     year = {1976},
     pages = { 1236-1239},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/1176343654}
}

Aumann, Robert J. Agreeing to Disagree. Ann. Statist., Tome 4 (1976) no. 1, pp.  1236-1239. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/1176343654/