Reflexive Intermediate Propositional Logics
Carter, Nathan C.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 47 (2006) no. 1, p. 39-62 / Harvested from Project Euclid
Which intermediate propositional logics can prove their own completeness? I call a logic reflexive if a second-order metatheory of arithmetic created from the logic is sufficient to prove the completeness of the original logic. Given the collection of intermediate propositional logics, I prove that the reflexive logics are exactly those that are at least as strong as testability logic, that is, intuitionistic logic plus the scheme $\neg φ ∨ \neg\neg φ. I show that this result holds regardless of whether Tarskian or Kripke semantics is used in the definition of completeness. I also show that the operation of creating a second-order metatheory is injective, thereby insuring that I am actually considering each logic independently.
Publié le : 2006-01-14
Classification:  intermediate logics,  completeness,  reflexivity,  03F50,  03F55
@article{1143468310,
     author = {Carter, Nathan C.},
     title = {Reflexive Intermediate Propositional Logics},
     journal = {Notre Dame J. Formal Logic},
     volume = {47},
     number = {1},
     year = {2006},
     pages = { 39-62},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/1143468310}
}
Carter, Nathan C. Reflexive Intermediate Propositional Logics. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 47 (2006) no. 1, pp.  39-62. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/1143468310/