Frege's Proof of Referentiality
Linnebo, Øystein
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 45 (2004) no. 1, p. 73-98 / Harvested from Project Euclid
I present a novel interpretation of Frege's attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29--31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege's proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege's proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successfully be applied.
Publié le : 2004-04-14
Classification:  Frege,  reference,  context principle,  abstraction principles,  03A05
@article{1095386645,
     author = {Linnebo, \O ystein},
     title = {Frege's Proof of Referentiality},
     journal = {Notre Dame J. Formal Logic},
     volume = {45},
     number = {1},
     year = {2004},
     pages = { 73-98},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://dml.mathdoc.fr/item/1095386645}
}
Linnebo, Øystein. Frege's Proof of Referentiality. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Tome 45 (2004) no. 1, pp.  73-98. http://gdmltest.u-ga.fr/item/1095386645/